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ABSTRACT 
This working paper analyzes the extent to which human rights have been accepted by Indonesian 
military and police officers since democratization in 1999. It finds that few accept human rights 
fully but most pay at least lip service. Human rights have not been adopted as universal, are 
considered alienable or alien to Indonesia. Where security forces embrace an active role as 
defenders of human rights, there remains a gap in human rights protection. Marginalized groups 
suffer most from the resulting enforcement failure caused by competing normative convictions 
and unclear legislation. Future advocacy attempts should stress the active role of security forces in 
the pursuit of a comprehensive human rights regime and consider possible tensions between 
individual convictions and the universal claims of the international human rights regime. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most vital objectives of post-authoritarian reform processes has been to adjust the 
behavior of the existing security forces to the demands of the new democratic polity. In addition to 
the basic problem of expanding civilian control of the new government over the military1, decades 
of authoritarian rule can profoundly affect the outlook of both military and police, prioritizing the 
protection of regime and state in a narrow sense over the security of citizens. While Trinkunas and 
others have identified robust civilian strategies of punishment and surveillance of non-compliant 
behavior as a viable option to sanction the military into submission and enforce human rights2, 
such behavior requires considerable political capital and can result in staunch military resistance 
or even violent backlashes3.  
Given these problems and the difficulty of fostering the necessary reforms from the outside, in the 
last 20 years Security Sector Reform (SSR) has emerged as the dominant paradigm of donor-driven 
reform initiatives in post-conflict and post-authoritarian settings with a focus on the security 
forces4. 
SSR describes the process of transforming “those institutions authorized to use or threaten force in 
the name of the state as well as to those bodies and agencies responsible for the oversight of such 
institutions”5 towards an end state in which they respect and apply “democratic norms and sound 
principles of good governance”6. One of its basic tenets is to shift the priorities of security from 
state towards human security7. To do so, a combination of awareness raising, education and 
practical training are meant to foster a deeper respect for the idea and practice of human rights 
among a country’s security forces. While this education- and persuasion-based process of 
socialization is an accepted and less confrontational alternative to enforcement-based approaches 
for civil-military reform8, the underlying mechanism and its effects on norm adoption and 
compliance remains poorly understood in the policy-driven SSR discourse.  
In International Relations a sizeable literature focusses on the question how norms like human 
rights reach new political contexts9 and in Social and Development Anthropology, the idea of 
“traveling models” or “vernacularization” of norms10 have focused on similar questions. Many 
existing approaches are based on the idea of a linear transfer. However, the understanding of 
human rights – just like news traveling through the grapevine – is subject to a process of strategic 
adaptation and cultural interpretations. The process can result in the skewed adoption of these 
norms with severe implications for the security sector reform process. As for the definition of 
security itself, local actors will likely have different notions veering between human rights as a 
mandate for “power and social order” and one as an “entitlement and form of empowerment”11. 
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This paper demonstrates these moments during the process of norm transfer in Indonesia and 
contributes to the understanding of the dynamic process of translation and adaptation and the 
manifest tensions among and within different security actors it can result in. In Indonesia reform 
civil society activists and civilian politicians considered military and – to a lesser extent – police 
reform as the most urgent elements of Security Sector Reform. Consequently, and unlike previous 
research on this topic12, this study focusses on the attitudes of military and police officers, the main 
perpetrators of human rights violations but also the ones who have to enforce human rights 
against third party infringements.  
Indonesia is a young democracy with a recent history of systematic human rights violations by 
both the autocratic New Order government and its military and police. These were committed 
against the political opposition during regime crises, under the exceptional circumstances of 
counter-insurgency operations against separatists as well as in the form of “day-to-day” 
repression13. As in other post-authoritarian settings, international donors and local reform 
constituencies in Indonesia strove to improve the state’s human rights record and have done so 
through a range of SSR initiatives, stressing trainings and awareness-raising most heavily.14 15  
Based on my own interviews and verbatim transcripts of statements by security actors I tackle two 
main research questions: 
1. To what degree has the idea and practice of universal human rights been accepted by state 
security actors in Indonesia and how did it interact with existing local norms? 
2. What are the effects of the resulting normative pattern on the human rights record of 
security forces? 
The working paper proceeds in three steps. The first section looks at existing explanations for the 
way norms travel and the sometimes incomplete way they adjust to new contexts. Second, I 
provide an introduction to the cultural and legal reference points for human rights in Indonesian 
political history. Third, I analyze statements by security actors16 to determine their stance towards 
the concept and practice of human rights and present evidence that these prevalent value patterns 
have affected Indonesia’s human rights profile and resulted in a propensity of security forces to 
engage in “deniable” human rights violations and a serious lack of protection for the rights of 
minorities against violations of their rights by horizontal challengers. A conclusion summarizes the 
argument and derives some avenues to adapt human rights advocacy programs. 
1. HOW HUMAN RIGHTS TRAVEL 
The Security Sector Reform (SSR) approach requires state and security actors to shift from existing 
patterns of legitimization for repressive and coercive behavior towards an acceptance of human 
rights as the driving factor. However, the SSR discourse has so far undertheorized the question of 
how its reforms and norms are received in local contexts, focusing on cloudy notions of increasing 
“local ownership”17. There is a long tradition of explaining processes of norm-transfer in Social 
Anthropology as well as in International Relations.  
One family of theories about how norms and ideas spread from one context to another postulates 
distinct but similar processes of evolution or modernization in both early and late adopting 
countries18: According to this strand of thought, developing states emulate the Western process of 
modernization and more or less automatically end up with the same value patterns. In crude 
Marxist terms, the changing social existence after modernization would entail parallel changes in 
the collective consciousness of developing countries. Ultimately, all countries that complete their 
modernization process would end up with isomorphic structures as well as norms19.  
In contrast, early proponents of “diffusion” argued that social inventions spread outward from 
their places of origin20. This implies that the global periphery will learn and eventually accept them 
over time, following a model of sender and recipient. While this version of the argument today is 
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widely rejected in Social Anthropology and has come under pressure in Sociology and 
International Relations as well21, 22, 23, it remains relevant among SSR and other development 
practitioners24. Not only has this tendency been criticized as paternalistic25, it also oversimplifies 
reform. If one is to accept its implications, Security Sector Reform becomes a mere matter of 
international donors explaining and domestic decision-makers “implementing” the proposed 
institutional prerequisites, learning the “correct” values and procedures and improving the 
material capacity of local security forces. Following this logic, the success of SSR programs can be 
evaluated simply by observing the success or failure of legal reform, the incidence and completion 
of training courses and the volume of material assistance. This is in fact the rationale behind many 
development agencies’ impact evaluations. However, the transfer of norms is a matter much 
different from the transfer of objective knowledge: Even if the trainings are conducted well much 
can go wrong in the process of conveying the complex requirements of today’s Security Sector 
Reform agenda. Consequently, any model of this process has to account for its inherent 
complexities. 
During the late 1990s, researchers in International Relations, most notably Risse, Ropp and 
Sikkink, revived the idea of diffusion in a more complex model to account for some of these 
problems for the diffusion of human rights, an essential element of the SSR agenda26. Even though 
“diffusion” itself implies a relatively passive and automatic seeping-in of international norms into 
domestic contexts, this approach provides a more dynamic underlying mechanism. Human rights 
diffusion, it argues, is based on a discursive process between international community and 
transnational activist movements on the one hand and state governments on the other27. Even 
though local governments usually deny the accusations levelled against them, the model assumes 
they will eventual make tactical concessions to ease international pressure. If this pressure persists, 
the government eventually accepts the prescriptive status of human rights. The authors argue that 
this process of instrumental adaptation is the more common mechanism in international politics, 
but reformers can also persuade governments to see the intrinsic merit of human rights, leading to 
its voluntary acceptance. In any case, the norms will become formally institutionalized, the 
prescribed behavior habitualized over time. Ultimately, the identities, interests and behaviors of 
both state agents and the wider population will adapt to internalize these formerly alien norms. 
Once that happens, the need for incentives or punishment will fade and compliance will become 
automatic28.  
While this model is certainly more apt at capturing some of the negotiations underlying the 
extension of Human Rights’ reach into new geographic and political regions, it still falls short of 
the mark. First, it assumes international community and domestic government to be in 
confrontation with each other1, but the latter might merely fail to implement an existing 
conviction into actual policy in the absence of government control over the security services or 
their national territory1. Second, the approach is confrontational toward the security forces: If the 
target of international pressure is “a particularly awesome violation of human rights”1, the whole 
process can elicit resistance from security actors leading to its ultimate failure1. If the premise of a 
persuasion attempt is past misbehavior, the majority of security actors would have to interpret it as 
a veiled threat of blame, prosecution and punishment. Finally, and most importantly, Zimmerman 
has pointed out that the model expects target countries either to resist in the presence of strong 
veto players or to accept a norm completely when it is receptive. Ultimately, she stresses, “there is a 
linear scale from resistance to norm adoption”29. As with other iterations of modernization or 
diffusion discussed earlier, there is no middle ground and acceptance is dichotomous. This is true 
even for more nuanced versions of the argument. Jetschke, for example, has focused on state 
attempts to justify non-compliant behavior through two communicative strategies. First, target 
states can try to get away with disclaiming responsibility for ongoing human rights violations and 
shift blame to militia groups or other actors outside their control30, this works best for human 
rights violations in areas of weak statehood or contested sovereignty31. Second, government 
perpetrators of human rights abuses can contest the priority of human rights over an equally 
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accepted international norm. Among these, national sovereignty is frequently invoked to justify 
human rights violations against groups considered secessionist32, more general claims of protecting 
national security are useful against groups who (supposedly) disturb the target state’s conception 
of state or national security norms33.  
A third communicative strategy, not mentioned by Jetschke, provides the first of several rationales 
for applying anthropological methods to gain a deeper understanding of the way international 
norms are transferred or not transferred. Instead of relying on international norms, governments 
and security forces can claim priority of existing local norms over human rights as a justification 
for non-compliance. This can be ascertained only through participatory observation, focus group 
discussions and close analysis of statements and attitudes about human rights made by officials. 
While this strategy does not guarantee governments actually share these norms, it can still provide 
a strong claim to legitimacy, especially in young democracies and especially towards the domestic 
population. Of course, local NGOs with their often rights-oriented mindset are an important 
constituency for reform that can force governments to accept human rights and enforce 
compliance, as Jetschke argues34. However, democratic governments are by their nature 
accountable to the population at large and their political decisions have to take norms prevalent 
outside of the movement sector into account. Reforms demanded by international audiences and 
domestic activist groups can alienate domestic audiences if the latter hold different and less liberal 
values and attitudes. This is frequently the case in young democracies of the global south and 
especially in East and Southeast Asia35. The task of the researcher then is to 1) ascertain which 
competing norms are prevalent and 2) how and whether state agents appeal to them. 
In these cases the appeal to domestic norms – just like the shifting of blame or the appeal to 
alternative international norms as Jetschke describes – are merely communicative defense 
strategies and part of an arsenal of other “official denials”36 rather than signs of a (partial) 
acceptance of international norms. However, state actors might just as well be unwilling to accept 
the applicability of human rights or skew their implementation if they would otherwise compete 
with prevalent cultural norm patterns. Under these circumstances, the encounter between 
international norms and distinct value-laden local contexts can not only produce handy excuses 
but a manifest, often creative tension between the different norm systems that affects not just 
whether human rights are adopted, but the actual content and shape of the resulting domestic 
enactment.  
In line with this realization, dichotomous conceptualizations of diffusion are now widely 
discredited in Social Anthropology and have come under pressure in International Relations as 
well37. Instead, alternative approaches study specific aspects of the process of how ideas spread and 
often arrive at diverging evaluations of its outcome. Some of these explicitly concentrate on the 
object of diffusion, in this case the idea of human rights, and the process of mediation and 
reconstruction is has to undergo while it is adapted to a new context38.  
This process has variously been referred to as translation39, vernacularization40, hybridization41, 
syncretization or creolization42. In essence, all of these concepts describe very similar empirical 
phenomena: Norms claiming purchase on a new context are rarely adopted as they are but rather 
become adjusted and transformed. This is a highly creative and selective process. Target 
populations have the agency to pick certain cultural traits according to their own habits and wishes 
and turn the formerly foreign concept from something strange into something of their own. 
During this process, the flow of constituent parts of the wider concept is largely determined by the 
resonance it evokes in a target subject’s own value system43 and their relevance for individuals 
learning about them. The adaptation of “travelling models” like Human Rights can profoundly 
change their appearance but Levitt and Merry stress that they will often retain the essence of the 
norm and even make it more relevant to its new context44.  
PRIF Working Paper No. 40 
5 
 
Goldstein describes how Human Rights were appropriated by indigenous movements in Bolivia to 
become a weapon of the poor for social justice rather than a weapon of the rich to defend their 
liberal prerogatives45. Authors in this tradition have criticized terms like hybridization or 
syncretization for carrying a pejorative undertone, for implying that these adjustments make the 
translated and adapted version of a norm something less than the original46. Even though 
proponents of terms of mixture like hybridization have rejected this criticism47, there is some truth 
behind the implication that the adjustments can detract from the original concept. SSR discourse 
has picked up the idea that “hybrid security” concepts allow for the analysis of a multitude of 
arenas where “security is enacted and negotiated”48. Moreover, in a sense the new emphasis on true 
localization of SSR has brought a drive towards not just local input but true participation to reflect 
local priorities in the reform agenda49. 
Accepting these new mixtures as something valuable, however, does not mean that every aspect of 
security governance arrangements should be negotiable: chaotic and violent arrangements are not 
automatically valuable from an SSR standpoint simply because they are supposedly in line with 
local traditions50. The same goes for the Human Rights concept. Its numerous constituent rights 
and freedoms allow for some level of recalibration. Absolute property rights can be relaxed in 
order to guarantee their responsible use or to increase social welfare, respect for religion might lead 
to moderate restrictions on the freedom of expression. However, as soon as local priorities deeply 
infringe on other people’s rights – if the freedom of a minority religion is violated on behalf of the 
majority – or basic tenets like the right to life, liberty and security of person are endangered for the 
sake of the moral sensitivities of others, the local hybrid of Human Rights has in fact become less 
than the original concept. Local elites might favor and legitimize certain readings of a norm that 
are in line with existing value patterns not because they truly believe these competing norms valid 
but rather for purely strategic reasons51.  
These considerations have three consequences for this study. First, the process in which Human 
Rights as an international norm are introduced into a new context is neither linear, uni-directional 
and deterministic nor is acceptance necessarily complete. Consequently, evaluating the success of a 
transfer means looking deeply inside the rhetoric of local actors, to grasp at the attitudes they hold. 
To do so, anthropological research is invaluable. By studying actors and events up close through 
direct observation or in-depth questioning, anthropologists are able to go beyond merely stating 
that some form of mixing or creolization has occurred. They can observe micro-level dynamics 
and hence understand how norm circulation and translation evolves where normative concepts are 
actually applied52. This kind of analysis can help uncover instances where local norms are merely 
used as a form of defense against the adoption of human rights and instances where they become 
part of an actor’s vernacular and often adopt a slightly different meaning after translation. 
Whether actors behave the way they do because of their system of beliefs or rather for merely 
strategic reasons has important implications for future advocacy and reform efforts.  
Second, because the acceptance of an international norm has to be measured on a continuum and 
because strategic considerations as well as cultural values influence the shape and content of an 
outcome norm, different domestic groups will likely translate the norm differently. Whereas 
reformist forces like NGOs might prefer an expansive reading, security actors will likely adopt a 
more limited reading of the same norm. Since the SSR agenda aims to change the attitude of 
security forces towards a wider understanding of security, it is their rhetoric and attitudes that 
measure success best.  
Third, since Human Rights have a universalist essence and as such are only negotiable to a certain 
extent, the idea of vernacularization, though not all of its normative implications, are a valuable 
tool to understand the process of (partial) acceptance of human rights. The underlying model calls 
for an analysis of the interaction between human rights and existing normative models among the 
security forces to identify points of tension and resonance. Furthermore, attitudes held by security 
actors have implications for their behavior. The extent to which human rights are respected and 
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enforced by security forces can therefore suffer if security forces adopt a version of them that falls 
short of their essence. I will therefore preface the analysis with an overview of the pertinent value 
patterns among Indonesian state actors at the time of democratization. Then, the main section 
analyzes a) how these values have interacted with the global human rights concept to form 
different vernacularized human rights concepts and b) how incomplete hybrid interpretations have 
influenced the resulting Human Rights practice. 
2. HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDONESIAN POLITICAL HISTORY 
Indonesia’s Dutch colonial legacy deemphasized individual human rights in favor of peace and 
order. While governance of the colony was initially very narrow in both geography and its effect on 
the daily lives of Indonesians53, colonial rule quickly became more repressive. A short liberal phase 
at the beginning of the 20th century also saw the repression of “backwards” cultural practices, like 
the widow-burning and the slave trade54. When the simultaneous expansion of education 
opportunities resulted in an upsurge of political activism and public criticism of colonialism the 
Dutch constricted public space and abandoned an expansion of political rights in favor of “rust en 
orde”, a quiet and orderly society55. 
During their short occupation between 1942 and 1945, the Japanese created religious and 
nationalist militias (laskar) to channel societal mobilization against a potential return of the Dutch. 
When they did return after 1945 the Indonesian government initially tolerated a much higher 
degree of political mobilization and encouraged Indonesians in their pursuit of political 
participation56. Even when President Sukarno completed a self-coup to give himself dictatorial 
powers in 1959, his rule was based partly on the support of the Indonesian communists who 
advocated the ideal of a mobilized and politically active public. The chaos of the 1965–66 anti-
communist politicide gave Major General Suharto the chance to return Indonesia to a more 
subdued political culture. The initial overt repression of political opposition under the headlines of 
“security and order”, keamanan dan ketertiban, and controlled by the notorious Operations 
Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) was quickly transformed into a 
less overtly violent system of surveillance and strictly limited mobilization. Political rights and civil 
liberties were no longer part of the goals of governance. Instead, Suharto’s established the 
organicist “New Order” based on the value of a harmonious society and a security system known. 
Of course this was always based on the normative convictions of the “moral majority” or more 
precisely the political establishment: Advocates of human rights, regime critics but also 
perpetrators of unwanted horizontal violence were locked away or murdered quietly where 
possible, suppressed in bouts of violence where necessary57. Meanwhile, Indonesia developed a 
strong tradition of vigilantism under which neighborhood watches and people’s security 
committees cooperated with BIMMAS, a special liaison department within the National Police 
Polri. In the absence of external threats, the Indonesian security forces, focused on suppressing the 
political opposition and dealt with secessionist rebels like the Movement Free Aceh (GAM), the 
Operation Free Papua (OPM) and – most importantly – the Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) that fought for Timorese independence after the Indonesian 
annexation of the territory in 1975. In fulfilling their assigned tasks of guaranteeing Indonesia’s 
territorial integrity and regime security military and police both routinely violated human rights58. 
Under Indonesia’s brand of nationalism – rooted in the unity of the state rather than cultural 
homogeneity – separatism was regarded a threat to the very existence of Indonesia itself even 
among regular civilians. 
During most of Indonesia’s existence, constitutional protection of human rights was inexistent. 
The Indonesian Basic Law of 1945 on which Sukarno’s as well as Suharto’s regime were based, did 
not even list human rights. Only the Provisional Constitution of 1950, in existence for a mere nine 
years until 1959, is an exception. It established several fundamental rights for Indonesians and was 
largely in line with international standards of the time59. These rights only returned to political 
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prominence and to the text of the Indonesian constitution during the process of constitutional 
amendments between 1999 and 2003. Today, the constitution includes an expansive bill of rights 
and provisions for the rule of law. Among other things, it still lacks a negative freedom of religion 
and basic rights can be suspended for security reasons or to protect religious sensitivities60. 
Indonesia acceded to the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Social, Economic and 
Cultural Rights only in 2006 and even then insisted on interpreting the right to self-determination 
in a way that would exclude secessionist movements. 
Considering this lack of a liberal political tradition it is unsurprising, that the concept of human 
rights was neither accepted nor even fully known by most security actors following the transition 
to democracy in 1998/99. Rather, most of them had internalized the preference for a quiet and 
peaceful rather than lively, participatory and mobilized society during the long years of Suharto’s 
rule and were willing to subordinate human rights to a host of competing principles. 
In civil society, the long legacy of the New Order government had inculcated democracy activists 
and the proponents of human rights with an intense distrust of the Indonesian government and its 
security forces61 and even though the transition saw many acts of horizontal violence, few 
advocated a more active role or even an expansion of the authority of the state security forces to 
counter these acts of violence.  
3. PATTERNS AND CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCEPTIONS SINCE 1999 
The following analysis of statements by security actors during focus group discussions between 
2002 and 2010 and interviews in 2010 and 2013 demonstrate that few adopted an understanding of 
human rights fully in line with the international standard. Most of the following statements were 
made during meetings organized by the ProPatria Working Group for SSR. The British 
Department for International Development had funded this civil society organization to host a 
series of focus group discussions with members of civil society, politicians and the security forces. 
Under the terms of the Chatham House Rules, statements and proposals made during these 
meetings could be used for policy decisions by participants but not ascribed to individuals and the 
atmosphere was frank and participants spoke their mind. Since the material was recorded under 
condition of anonymity and in the absence of foreign donors, the effects of social desirability are of 
less concern, increasing the chance to observe more unmediated attitudes. Even though the 
transcripts contain the full name and position of all participants, the following quotations are 
anonymized and refer to the speaker only by his or her status group membership to respect the 
terms of the meetings62.  
Even on their own, these patterns of acceptance and denial are indications of the degree to which 
human rights as an international model have travelled successfully. However, the results are also in 
line with patterns of human rights violations in democratic Indonesia since democratization.  
Shortly after the transition, some military officers still disputed the fact of past human rights 
violations by the security forces. One of them angrily replied to charges of human rights violations 
by civil society activist Munir Said Thalib during a ProPatria event that “Just because Munir thinks 
it is true doesn’t make it so”63. As early as five years after the transition very few active military or 
police officers still denied the factuality of abuses. The stance of most individual officers towards 
the role of human rights in the security sector follows one of several patterns of limited acceptance 
at best.  
3.1 Undue Burden 
In interviews and during focus group discussions many security officers implicitly, but often also 
explicitly, gave competing norms precedence over the value of human rights. In their view, human 
rights had to take a backseat to security and the upkeep of social harmony, which they considered 
their core task. Otherwise, an increased threat of prosecution for human rights violations would 
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become an almost debilitating concern to officers in the field. One military officer stressed this in 
2002 in reaction to an upsurge in “small town wars”64 – horizontal conflicts between different 
ethnic and religious groups at the local level without the involvement of state security forces 
“If the local governments need help, there should not be a problem! Then the governor and 
[head of district government] can say: Please just help, already. You do not have to be afraid 
of human rights and so on.”65 
Following this line of argument also meant that an expansion in human rights education had in 
fact compounded the problem. Another military officer stressed: 
“If the security forces are already aware of the role of human rights, they will be very 
careful. […] Soldiers and police don’t want to become involved in investigations because 
they fear they will be blamed afterwards if something goes wrong.”66 
This attitude was not prevalent in the military alone. A police officer made it quite clear that 
human rights violations were a necessary evil if the security forces wanted to be effective. Units in 
troubled areas naturally had to ignore or even violate human rights to prevent these crises67. 
In the minds of police and military officers alike, upholding the social harmony and peace so 
stressed in Indonesia’s political history was still more important than respect for the relatively 
more recent idea of human rights. Military officers made the same argument even more 
emphatically when it came to threats to what they traditionally valued most, i.e. Indonesia’s 
territorial integrity. Talking about the fight against the GAM separatists in Aceh province a 
military member of the department of defense said in 2003: 
“I know human rights are important, but there is a point where it is bad for morale if rebels 
can go free.”68 
In reference to the same group, an army general summarized this position quite bluntly:  
“Always respecting human rights will make Indonesia weak.”69 
The common argument was that the fight against separatism, Indonesia’s territorial integrity 
would necessarily suffer should human rights ever be given precedence. Human rights were simply 
a nuisance that limited the effectiveness of security forces.  
Indeed, officers at this stage of “denial” would be inclined to ignore human rights in any situation 
where higher goals like harmony or territorial integrity were at stake. The early years of the 
Indonesian transition are ripe with cases where security forces were willing to violate human rights 
even where it was visible to the outside world. Beyond everyday instances of manhandling criminal 
suspects, these cases included unrestrained violence against GAM separatists70 as well as open 
repression against peaceful proponents of independence in East Timor province in 199871. 
Similarly, Papuan independence activist Theys Eluay was murdered by off-duty members of 
Indonesian Special Forces in 2001 – his murderers later called “heroes” by members of the military 
leadership72. Finally, even democratically legitimate protestors came into conflict with what 
security officials considered their ideal of social harmony. Following a series of anti-government 
protests against interim-President Habibie in 1999 the military agreed to the use of violence 
against the demonstrators in what is today called the “Second Tragedy of Semanggi”, killing at least 
two and injuring several more73. 
3.2 Instrumental Respect 
While there are certainly some officers who openly express their opposition against human rights, 
most accept an – albeit grudging – adherence to the new standards. Many among them do so for 
instrumental reasons rather than an intrinsic appreciation but their reasoning varies. Many older 
officers who spent most of their careers fighting separatists or posted in combat outfits worry that 
accusations of human rights abuse can become a pretext for foreign intervention in Indonesian 
affairs just like violence in East Timor following the independence referendum in 1999 ultimately 
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resulted in a UN mission. A hardline senior military officers who had been accused of committing 
human rights violations in the aftermath of the 1998 transition himself said:  
“The penetration of Western culture and human rights have damaged the character of this 
nation by eroding nationalism and this might in turn be very dangerous. […] There is so 
much talk about democratization and human rights today […] if we violate these principles 
it can lead to foreign intervention.”74 
Even known moderates who otherwise favored military and police reform espoused similar 
attitudes during interviews and focus group discussions75 and their position is aptly summarized in 
this half-joking statement: 
“For the survival of this nation we face external and internal threats. The external threats 
are called HAM [human rights], the internal threat is called GAM.”76 
Two important consequences flow from this first narrowly instrumental stance. First, it can further 
aggravate the strained relationship between the security sector and civil society activists looking to 
document existing abuse. Several civil society activists have made a note about the prevalence of 
this criticism especially among the military77. Fearing an increase in external meddling in 
Indonesian affairs, a senior military field officer explicitly accused civil society activists of 
employing human rights as a weapon to hurt Indonesia’s national interests:  
“If NGO or other bodies report on human rights abuses, sometimes even if the accusations 
are not true, this can hurt Indonesian interests. We should take care of our own problems, 
no need to involve foreigners.”78 
Second, officers advocating compliant behavior merely on the basis of the negative reaction human 
rights violations can provoke from among the international community and domestic reform 
constituency would not necessarily object to covert human rights violations: Their attitudes 
suggest only tactical concessions to avoid further pressure for reform. Given plausible deniability 
of military involvement or an area of operation inaccessible to NGOs or the media their behavior 
would likely change. Actual examples of human rights violations that can result from such 
attitudes include the military-induced militia violence against proponents of the 1999 
independence referendum in East Timor79, the murder of Human Rights activist Munir by a 
suspected operative of the Indonesian National Intelligence Body (BIN) in 2004 as well as 
numerous human rights violations during covert operations and a media blackout in Aceh 
between 2001 and 200480. Even though the underlying attitudes are still very prevalent among mid-
ranking military officers81, the military leadership no longer condoned these forms of covert 
activities after 2005, significantly reducing the scope and frequency of human rights violations82.  
The second line of argument for an instrumental acceptance of human rights is less likely to result 
in human rights violations even under attenuating circumstances. While they might not embrace 
human rights as a basic norm, many officers have at least accepted the fact that violations would 
only create more insurgents or terrorists. Summarizing this stance expressed by many younger 
officers during their informal discussion with me, Ansyaad Mbai, head of the Indonesian counter-
terrorism agency BNPT told me: 
“If you arrest the wrong people, shoot them, there will only be more people. Everybody has 
a brother, a nephew […] if you kill someone wrongly, his relatives will be angry and you 
create a new terrorist or two. Then the problem gets worse. For the military that used to be 
no problem, they just treat everyone as enemy. But in law enforcement today you have to be 
very careful. You need a different mindset.”83 
Finally, in their conversations with me some military officers even applaud the fact that the 
increased pressure on the military helped to accelerate the wider acceptance of military reform 
among the troops. Again, this is not necessarily a sign human rights are fully embraced but at least 
underlines the relevance of the instrumental effect international and domestic pressure for human 
rights compliant behavior can have even if they remain an essentially alien concept to some 
officers84. 
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3.3 Rights as Alien or Alienable 
Even though the former statements indicate a reluctance to actively violate human rights, it is clear 
that many officers still believe human rights to be alienable, overall alien or not yet right for 
Indonesia. Even among officers who accept human rights either for intrinsic or instrumental 
reasons there are many who believe that not all of them are created equal, giving precedence to 
religious sensitivities or denying protections against wrongful arrests or right to an attorney85. 
Moreover, many doubt that this full on respect for human rights is even appropriate for 
Indonesia’s current state of development. A senior army officer said:  
“In Indonesia the transition has to happen gradually, not in a revolution tomorrow. In my 
opinion that is not healthy […]. I guess I am saying TNI is not good, not well yet. The 
military man consists of blood, flesh and emotions but TNI has the faith to try it. Now [...]. 
If there are still violations much later on, our kids can pursue them.”86 
Many military officers have echoed this attitude in private or more informal conversations and 
there is a similar attitude among the police. At least in its current situation, a soft-handed human 
rights driven approach is supposedly ill-adapted to Indonesian realities as one mid-ranking police 
officer expressed during a focus group discussion: 
“I think the police has to be like its society. A tiger cannot protect a goat. A goat cannot 
protect a tiger. So you need a tiger to protect a tiger. It depends on the society.” (PP 
27.04.2004) 
Specifically, Indonesian citizens are seen as too immature and too rash in their behavior as to be 
awarded all the rights that come with liberal democracy. For all the moments social harmony and 
peace that are portrayed as quintessentially Indonesian, security officers still consider actual 
Indonesians somewhat childlike – irresponsible and unruly – a contradictory but well-known 
trope of the Suharto dictatorship87. Even today officers otherwise known for their moderate 
outlook hold this attitude: 
“I am not certain that Indonesia can or should already guarantee full human rights for its 
population. Today people only see one side of the coin. The only think of freedom, they 
only think of the state providing security. They do not see that this calls for them to act, to 
behave a certain way, to behave responsibly. Nobody wants to do anything or limit their 
actions to be able to be safe. You know ideally, it should really be ‘human responsibility’ 
first, then human rights.”88 
On the surface these statements are a sign that human rights are not yet widely accepted as an 
intrinsic goal that surpasses other competing norms like security or social harmony among 
security actors. The flip-side of this attitude is that it can 1) deprive groups considered undeserving 
of the protection of human rights, including criminals or other trouble-makers and 2) in certain 
circumstances even turn the burden of guilt from perpetrators to victims of violence.  
Especially among the police there are officers who prioritize an orderly society over respect for 
human rights. This can evoke hostile or even violent reactions towards those considered deviant or 
not deserving of human rights protection. Among other things, this is indicated by the denial of 
humane treatment for prisoners. One participant of the ProPatria focus group discussions reported 
a complete lack of understanding by local police officers when confronted about the inhumane 
conditions of their holding cells, since these were “for criminals only”89. Actors who interfere with 
the established ideas of peace and order are less likely to find understanding and protection from 
security forces, even if they are exercising their democratic rights. Again, supporters and active 
members of secessionist groups suffer most from this. However, younger, mid-ranking officers 
also complain about political protests, stating that “going demonstrating like that interferes with 
the smooth running of everyday business”90, an attitude confirmed during many of my informal 
discussions with even younger and very reformist police officers. The situation can be more 
difficult for religious minorities, as religious freedom is most often targeted by security actors as a 
source of social unrest. There are several recorded instances where security actors actively 
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pressured perceived deviants or heretics: A West Java military commander encouraged members 
of the majority Muslim community to occupy mosques of the Ahmadiyya minority sect to convert 
them back to the Sunni Islam of the majority. Ahmadis who became victims of violence have even 
been prosecuted for proselytizing instead of their attackers91. 
3.4 Signs of Hope? 
Despite the widespread resistance to the universalism of human rights in attitudes and practice and 
the persistent problems that result from it, there are also some encouraging signs. Several officers 
report a growing awareness and acceptance of human rights among their colleagues 92 and seem to 
have accepted the new normative order that emphasizes individual rather than state security: 
“At the time we did not appreciate human security or human rights. Of course it used to be 
that there are individuals as part of the state. But today it can no longer be said that the state 
is superior to the individuals.”93 
Others have come to accept Indonesia’s human rights record as an essential benchmark indicator 
for good governance94. For most of these officers, human rights call for more restraint from the 
security forces. However, there are some military officers who recognize a mandate for a more 
active role of their services to protect the population against violent non-state actors who threaten 
their security:  
“In the case of enforcement of human rights during a horizontal conflict [one without 
participation of state actors, PL], if there are agencies that are in charge of it, right then? If 
the institution concerned is not performing its duties and obligation, in curbing this 
disorder, then this is a violation by omission as well.”95 
Still, few officers believe they have a robust mandate against such third party violations and a more 
passive outlook prevails: Many police officers indicated a preference for restraint over enforcement 
when it comes to horizontal conflicts. During an interview one officer stressed:  
“Yes, even if someone threatens violence, you know – like with the church in Bekasi – I 
think it is the first duty of the police to mediate the conflict. If you don’t mediate and you 
just arrest people who are aggressive, there will only be more problems. People will blame 
the Christians if we arrest them and there is little support from us from the government.”96 
Even from this statement it is apparent that the resulting lack of involvement in horizontal 
conflicts can erode minority rights. Riots against existing Christian churches or their new 
construction in Muslim majority areas ultimately resulted in a withdrawal of building permits or 
closing of the church in question rather than prosecution of the instigators of violence97. 
Furthermore, extremists believe existing religious norms are a pretext for deadly violence against 
Ahmadis. During a public rally in 2008 the secretary general secretary of the radical Islamic 
Defenders Front (FPI) said:  
“It is halal to shed the blood of the Ahmadis. If people say that this killing violates human 
rights, I say, ‘Go to hell, the Human Rights declarations! Tai kucing (shit!), the Human 
Rights declaration! [...] Fight the Ahmadiyya, kill the Ahmadis, and exterminate the 
Ahmadis in Indonesia!”98 
Again, security forces regularly act too slowly or fail to provide protection against such third-party 
threats and the resulting human rights violations altogether99. Another police officer explicitly 
mentioned the Islamic Defenders Front during an interview and stressed that they would have to 
be treated like any other group in a democracy: 
“I don’t like what the FPI is doing […] they are very angry, very aggressive. But they are 
part of the community as well. It is democracy, […] we have to recognize the aspirations of 
the people. FPI have human rights, too. So if they advocate something, then we have to 
endure it. If they advocate against Ahmadiyya that is democracy as well.”100 
Considering that police officers present at the interview who agreed with such notions had also 
expressed annoyance at the behavior of (peaceful) democratic protesters indicates the extent of 
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remaining tensions between human rights and other competing norms even within the minds of 
younger, well-educated and reformist officers. The resulting lack of minority protection and 
sometimes active state discrimination against them under the banner of a more harmonious 
society have been identified as a major problem of Indonesia’s young democracy101. Even though 
individual convictions, might play a role among more junior military and police officers, police 
officers apparently also feel they lack the institutional capacity or even mandate to intervene102.  
3.5 Ambivalent Effects of Civil Society Activism 
Why have domestic civil society organizations advocating in the human rights field so far been 
unable to push for such clearer mandate and with it better protection against horizontal violence? 
One of the reasons is that many activists remain unable to trust the security forces. In their public 
statements they ask security forces to respect, less to enforce human rights. Human rights are 
considered a weapon against the security forces, not one to be wielded by them. Most importantly, 
many activists are unwilling to grant the state the necessary mandate and authority to protect 
minority groups. Representative of this position, a well-known human rights defender made it his 
explicit priority to eliminate every regulation from a proposed National Security Bill that had even 
the potential for state abuse. This came at the cost of delaying or stopping the law altogether that 
was needed to delineate the lines of authority between military and police103. 
Such blanket suspicion against the security sector as a whole is not rare. Until today, rumors about 
secret government agendas and sinister motives behind the establishment of overall clearer 
authority for internal security operations in horizontal conflicts abound. In recent years the “Law 
on the Management of Social Conflict” was the source of such debates. The law is meant to 
establish clear lines of responsibilities between civilian authorities, police and military in cases of 
horizontal violence and local unrest. Civil society security experts had long demanded such clearer 
regulations. After a more universal national security bill had failed under public resistance a more 
specialized bill was roundly criticized by many and suspected to spring from mostly economic 
interests of the government. Rather than welcoming the greater willingness of the security forces to 
become an arbiter in violent horizontal conflict different activists told me numerous versions of 
the following: 
“This is all part of the World Bank agenda. They want to push for their kind of development 
at the local level and they do not want to have any local protests against this.”104 
“We don’t need this. The law was only passed because there was money behind it from 
international companies.”105 
As a direct consequence of this obsession with the vertical dimension of human rights, i.e. the 
focus on restraining security forces, other attempts to assign clear responsibilities for ending 
horizontal conflict have failed106. This and the attitudes in the security sector have exacerbated the 
gap in human rights protection for minorities. Without an intrinsic appreciation of human rights, 
officers with an instrumental attitude are likely to drag their feet in horizontal conflict for fear of 
punishment for human rights violations by commission and those who think human rights 
alienable and value harmony and security are likely to shift at least some blame towards the victims 
with the same result. 
Like security actors, many civil society activists have seemingly adopted a concept of human right 
that differs from that advocated by international agencies. Often broad and undifferentiated, it 
seems to imply a preference for powerless security forces. During an interview the program 
director of one human rights group justified these oversimplifications. He suggested that his group 
had to use simple language and overly broad conceptions of human rights in the media: 
“We have to tailor our message to the audience. If I talk to academics I can be specific, 
detailed. If I talk to the media they want clear messages. I have to make things simple so 
everyone can understand it. You know […] everybody knows about human rights, but 
sometimes the people get confused […] when I talk about freedom of religion, freedom of 
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the press […] sometimes that is too complicated. People get confused. That would hurt our 
message.”107 
In reality, undifferentiated public allegations have not only further aggravated tension between 
security forces and civil society. They also alienated some moderate military officers who might 
otherwise have a more positive attitude towards the values underlying SSR. Several officer 
summarize these grievances: 
“I don’t get it. Today everything is always a violation of human rights!”108 
“Human rights defenders want to prevent us from acting preventive and preemptive. But in 
fact we actually want to fight for human rights! Whose rights are more important? That of 
terrorists or those of the possible victims?”109 
Security officers across all services and age groups have expressed profound weariness of being 
summarily criticized by civil society. Even some civil society activists admit this might be part of 
the reason civil society organizations are again seen as “trouble makers”110 disturbing the social 
peace. This image was commonly used for them during the years of the “New Order” dictatorship. 
4. CONCLUSION 
In Indonesia competing cultural and legal norms have been an obstacle to the acceptance of 
human rights. Security actors had a predominantly instrumental approach to human rights for at 
least the first decade after democratization, leaving room for covert violations. They often interpret 
the term or its implications in existing cultural categories and subordinate it to competing 
international or local norms. Rarely do actors espouse or at least profess an understanding that is 
in line with the “universal” concept and even if they do, they often feel without a mandate from 
government or society to enforce it.  
In contrast to the expectations of more linear models of human rights diffusion still prevalent in 
International Development, International Relations and more specifically the Security Sector 
Reform canon, human rights in Indonesia are a “travelling model” that underwent a process of 
vernacularization: Entered though internationally funded trainings and by local activists, the 
concept became subject to a process of translation and adaptation to local circumstances. In their 
adjustment attempts, security actors have chosen to deemphasize the protection of deviant groups 
to legitimize their non-compliance and implemented an understanding of human rights in line 
with prevalent cultural norms of social harmony. While this has reduced the incidence of vertical 
human rights violations of the state against its own population overall, the adaptation carried the 
cost of very limited protection for deviant or marginal groups.  
At the same time, vernacularization has created new lines of conflict between proponents and 
opponents of different translations of human rights: Civil society activists have attempted to use 
human rights as a tool to limit state capacity while security actors often recognized the need for 
additional authority to realize a minimum of protection against horizontal human rights 
violations. There is no linear pattern of acceptance or denial: enthusiastic proponents in the armed 
forces coexist with those who believe human rights protection will have to wait; civil society groups 
who still demand restraint from security forces sometimes clash with those who demand expanded 
authority for state actors. Even individual officers seem torn between their ostensible acceptance of 
democratic participation and a version of democratic tolerance that could even include violent 
groups like the Islamic Defenders Group on the one hand and their existing cultural preference for 
social harmony that makes them scoff at unruly protesters. 
International human rights advocates will be worried to discover that even after more than fifteen 
years of trainings and open discourse about human rights there are still honest misunderstandings 
among the security forces. One of the reasons for this stagnant development is the dilemma human 
rights organizations face in post-authoritarian settings. While they have to demand more restraint 
from security forces than under the authoritarian regime, they can weaken the capacity and resolve 
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of the state and create an enforcement gap in human rights protection. Most of Indonesia’s human 
rights organizations have erred on the side of distrust towards government and security forces. 
While the state today is no longer the major perpetrator of human rights violations it once was, its 
agents do too little, too late, to prevent third-party violations.  
Human rights trainings in young democracies should take this dynamic adaptation and its 
potential for incomplete adoption of norms into account. Before reform programs are developed, 
anthropologists should be consulted to identify local norms that could clash or compete with the 
substantive results of a human rights-oriented education. Actual trainings will have to stress the 
state’s protective role to a larger extent, tackle the problem of minority protection explicitly and 
elucidate solutions to the democratic dilemma of suppressing undemocratic dissent. Trainings 
have to include actors already professing a preference for human rights and communicate the 
importance of creating assertive security forces. Only careful training programs can demonstrate 
to the security forces and civil society reformers alike that the supposedly competing mandates of 
doing their job of establishing security and respect for human rights can be reconciled. Moreover, 
the success and failure of such trainings should not be measured by merely looking at the number 
of schooled participants or the public rhetoric of senior members of the security forces but rather 
include follow-up interviews, and observations of daily practice. 
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